Abstract: We present a new algorithm for automatic test generation for multicast routing. Our algorithm processes a nite state machine (FSM) model of the protocol and uses a mix of forward and backward search techniques to generate the tests. The output tests include a set of topologies, protocol events and network failures, that lead to violation of protocol correctness and behavioral requirements. We target protocol robustness in speci c, and do not attempt to verify other properties in this paper. We apply our method to a multicast routing protocol; PIM-DM, and investigate its behavior in the presence of selective packet loss on LANs and router crashes. Our study unveils several robustness violations in PIM-DM, for which we suggest xes with the aid of the presented algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Network protocol errors are often detected by application failure or performance degradation. Such errors are hardest to diagnose when the behavior is unexpected or unfamiliar. Even if a protocol is proven to be correct in isolation, its behavior may be unpredictable in an operational network, where interaction with other protocols and the presence of failures may a ect its operation.
The complexity of network protocols is increased with the exponential growth of the Internet, and the introduction of new services, such as IP multicast. In addition, researchers are observing new and obscure, yet all too frequent, failure modes over the internets; such as routing anomalies 1, 2], and selective loss over LANs 3] . Such failures are becoming more frequent, mainly due to the increased heterogeneity of network components. 1
RELATED WORK
There is a large body of literature dealing with veri cation of protocols. Veri cation systems typically address well-de ned properties {such as safety (e.g. deadlock freedom), liveness (e.g. livelock freedom), and responsiveness (e.g. timeliness) 5]{ and aim to detect violations of these properties. In general, the two main approaches for protocol veri cation are theorem proving and reachability analysis 6]. Theorem proving systems de ne a set of axioms and relations to prove properties mathematically. Theorem proving includes model-based (e.g. Z 7] ) and logic-based formalisms (e.g. Nqthm 8] ). In general, however, the number of axioms and relations grows with the complexity of the protocol. We believe that these systems will be even more complex, and perhaps intractable, for multicast protocols. Moreover, these systems work with abstract speci cations, and hence tend to abstract out some network dynamics that we will study; such as selective packet loss and router crashes.
Reachability analysis algorithms 9], on the other hand, try to generate and inspect all reachable protocol states. Such algorithms su er from the`state space explosion' problem, especially for complex protocols. To circumvent this problem, state reduction and partial search techniques 10] could be used. These algorithms, however, do not synthesize network topologies. Reduced reachability analysis has been used in the veri cation of cache coherence protocols 11], using a global FSM model. We adopt a similar FSM model and extend it for our approach in this study.
In 3] we have proposed a simulation-based STRESS testing method, based on heuristics and topological equivalences to reduce the number of simulated scenarios. However, we did not address automatic generation of topologies and events. Work in this paper complements our previous work, and may be integrated with the STRESS framework as part of its scenario generation.
VLSI chip testing 12] uses test vector generation to detect single-stuck faults. Test vectors may be generated based on circuit and fault models, using the fault-oriented process, that utilizes implication techniques for line justication. We adopt some implication concepts for our method, and transform them to the network protocol domain. We note that chip testing is performed for a given circuit, while a protocol must work over arbitrary and time varying topologies, adding a new dimension to the test generation problem.
METHOD OVERVIEW AND DEFINITIONS
The input to our method is the speci cation of a protocol, its correctness requirements, and a de nition of its robustness. In general, protocol robustness is the ability to respond correctly in the face of network failures and packet loss. Usually robustness is de ned in terms of network dynamics or fault models. A fault model represents various component faults; e.g. packet loss, or machine crashes. The desired output is a set of test-suites that stress the protocol mechanisms according to the robustness criteria.
Our method produces tests based on a model of the protocol. This section describes the model used and gives an overview of the case study protocol; PIM-DM.
System Model and Test De nition
The system consists of network and topology elements and a fault model.
Elements of the network consist of multicast capable nodes and bi-directional symmetric links. Nodes run same multicast routing, but not necessarily the same unicast routing. The topology is a N-router LAN modeled at the network level; we do not model the MAC layer.
A fault, is a low level (e.g. physical layer) anomalous behavior, that may a ect the protocol under test. An error is the failure of a protocol to meet its design requirement (e.g. duplicate packet delivery).
Faults include: a) Loss of packets due to queue congestion or failure. b) Loss of state, e.g. uni/multicast tables, due to failures or crashes. Loss duration varies with the nature of the failure. c) Delays due to transmission, propagation, or queuing delays. Some delay problems may be translated into sequencing problems (see section 1.4.6).
Usually, a fault model is de ned in conjunction with the protocol's robustness criteria. A design requirement for PIM is to be robust to single protocol message loss, which implies correct transitions from one stable state to another, even Multicast routing protocols deliver packets e ciently to group members by establishing distribution trees. PIM-DM uses broadcast-and-prune to establish the tree. In this mode of operation, a multicast packet is broadcast to all leaf subnetworks. Subnetworks with no local members send prune messages towards the source(s) of the packets to stop further broadcasts. Routers with new members joining the group trigger Graft messages towards previously pruned sources to re-establish the branches of the delivery tree. Graft messages are acknowledged explicitly at each hop using the Graft-Ack message. PIM-DM uses the underlying unicast routing tables to obtain the next-hop information, which may lead to situations where there are multiple forwarders for a LAN. The Assert mechanism resolves these situations and ensures there is at most one forwarder for the LAN.
In this study we target protocol robustness errors. We are interested mainly in erroneous stable (i.e. non-transient) states. We assume that protocol errors and correctness conditions are provided by the speci cation.
PIM Protocol Errors: A protocol error may manifest itself in one of the following ways: 1) black holes: consecutive packet loss between periods of packet delivery. 2) packet looping. 3) packet duplication. 4) join latency: excessive time taken by a receiver to start receiving packets. 5) leave latency: excessive time taken after a receiver leaves the group to stop the packet ow down pruned branches.
Correctness Conditions: These conditions are necessary to avoid errors during stable states in a LAN environment: 1) If there exists routers expecting packets from the LAN then there must exist a forwarder for the LAN, to pre-vent data loss (e.g. join latency or black holes).
2) The LAN must have at most one forwarder at a time, to prevent duplicates. 3) If there exists no routers expecting packets from the LAN there must not exist a forwarder for the LAN, to prevent leave latency. 4) The delivery tree must be loop-free. We do not consider looping in this study, as it is not a local behavior. 
APPLYING THE METHOD
Fault-oriented test generation (FOTG) targets speci c faults. Starting from a given fault, FOTG attempts to synthesize topology(ies) that may experience an error, and a sequence of events leading to the error.
The faults studied here are single message loss, and loss of state: 1. For a given message, the algorithm uses the protocol model to identify a set of stimuli and states needed to stimulate that message, and the possible states and stimuli elicited by the message. This set of states form the global system state to be inspected. The algorithm is repeated for each message.
For loss of state, the global state is constructed from the mechanisms necessary to create the state, and the algorithm is repeated for each state.
2. Subsequent system states are obtained, through a process called forward implication, after the fault is included in the implication rules. Forward implication is the process of inferring subsequent states from a given state. The subsequent stable state is checked for errors.
3. If an error occurs, an attempt is made to obtain a sequence of events leading from an initial state to the error state, if such state is reachable. Such process is called backward implication.
Details of these algorithms are presented in section 1.4.5.
PIM-DM Model
Following is the model of a simpli ed version of PIM-DM. Prune reception (P rune), Graft Acknowledgement reception (GAck), Assert reception (Assert), and forwarded packets reception (F Pkt).
3. Timer events: these events occur due to timer expiration (Exp) and include the Graft re-transmission timer (Rtx), the event of its expiration (RtxExp), the forwarder-deletion timer (Del), and the event of its expiration (DelExp).
The expiration of a timer is implied as (T imerImplication) when the timer is set. Classi cation of Transitions. We identify two types of transitions; externally triggered (ET) and internally triggered (IT) transitions. The former is stimulated by events external to the system (e.g. HJoin or Leave), whereas the latter is stimulated by events internal to the system (e.g. FPkt or Graft).
External host events (Ext
We note that some transitions may be triggered due to both internal and external events, depending on the scenario. For example, a Prune may be triggered due to forwarding packets by an upstream router FPkt (which is an internal event), or a Leave (which is an external event).
A global state is checked for correctness at the end of an externally triggered transition after completing its dependent internally triggered transitions.
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Following is a The process of identifying complete transitions depends on the nature of the protocol. But, in general, we may identify a complete transition sequence, as the sequence of (all) transitions triggered due to a single external stimulus (e.g.
HJoin or Leave). Therefore, we should be able to identify a transition based upon its stimuli (either external or internal).
At the end of each complete transition sequence the system exists in either a correct or erroneous stable state. Event-triggered timers (e.g. Del, Rtx) re at the end of a complete transition, satisfying the TimerImplication.
Also, according to the above completion concept, the proper analysis of behavior should start from externally triggered transitions. For example, analysis should not consider a Join without considering the Prune triggering it and its e ects on the system. Thus the global system state must be rolled back to the beginning of a complete transition (i.e. the previous stable state) before applying the forward implication. This will be implied in the forward implication algorithm discussed later, to simplify the discussion.
FOTG details
As previously mentioned, our FOTG approach consists of three phases: I) synthesis of the global state to inspect, II) forward implication, and III) backward implication. These phases are explained in more detail in this section.
FOTG starts from a given fault. The faults we address here are message and state loss.
Synthesizing the Global State.
Starting from a fault (i.e. the message or state to be lost), and using the information in the protocol model (i.e. the transition table), a global state is chosen for investigation. We refer to this state as the global-state inspected (G I ), and it is obtained for message loss as follows:
1. The global state is initially empty and the inspected message is initially set to the message to be lost.
2. For the inspected message, the state (or the startState of the transition) of the post-condition is obtained from the transition table. If the state does not exist in the global state, and cannot be implied therefrom, then it is added to the global state.
3. For the inspected message, the state (or the endState of the transition) of the pre-condition is obtained. If the state does not exist in the global state, and cannot be implied therefrom, then it is added to the global state.
4. Get the stimulus of the pre-condition of the inspected message. If this stimulus is not external (Ext), then set the inspected message to the stimulus, and go back to step 2.
Note that there may be several pre-conditions or post-conditions for a stimulus, in which case several choices can be made. These represent branching points in the search space.
At the end of this stage, the global state to be investigated is obtained. For state loss, the state dependency table is used to determine the message required to create the state, and the topology constructed for that message is used for the state. This is illustrated later in this section.
Forward Implication.
The states following G I (i.e. G I+i where i > 0) are obtained through forward implication. We simply apply the transitions, starting from G I , as given by the transition table, in addition to implied transitions (such as timer implication). In case of a message loss, the transition due to the lost message is not applied. If more than one state is a ected by the message, then the space searched is expanded to include the various selective loss scenarios for the a ected routers.
Backward Implication. Losing the Join by the forwarding router R k leads to an error state where router R i is expecting packets from the LAN, but the LAN has no forwarder. Single message loss. We have studied single message loss scenarios for the Join; Prune; Assert; and Graft messages. For brevity, we partially discuss our results here. For this subsection, we consider non-interleaving external events, where the system is stimulated only once between stable states. The Graft message is particularly interesting, since it is acknowledged, and it raises timing and sequencing issues that we address in a later subsection, where we extend our method to consider interleaving of external events. Forward implication is then applied, and behavior after the crash is checked for correct packet delivery. To achieve this, host stimuli (i.e. SPkt, HJ and L) are applied, then the system state is checked for correctness.
In lots of the cases studied, the system recovered from the crash (i.e. the system state was eventually correct). The recovery is mainly due to the nature of PIM-DM; where protocol states are re-created with reception of data packets. This result is not likely to extend to protocols of other natures; e.g. PIM Sparse- Mode 14] .
However, in violation with robustness requirements, there existed cases in which the system did not recover. In gure 1.3, the host joining in (II, a) did not have the su cient state to send a Graft and hence gets join latency until the negative cache state times out upstream and packets are forwarded onto the LAN as in (II, b) .
In gure 1.4 (II, a), the downstream router incurs join latency due to the crash of the upstream router. The state is not corrected until the periodic broadcast takes place, and packets are forwarded onto the LAN as in (II, b).
Limitations
The FOTG algorithms require a pre/post-condition global transition table, like the one presented in this paper. Generating such table from a conventional single router I/O FSM is part of our on-going work.
Currently the GFSM used in this study only models LANs. In our future work we will attempt to extend the model for regular and random topologies. Crash leading to black holes The LAN topologies constructed are inferred from the mechanisms speci ed by the transition table of the GFSM. The algorithm will not construct topologies resulting from non-speci ed mechanisms. For example, if the Assert mechanism was left out (due to a design error) the algorithm would not construct fF i ; F j g topology. So, FOTG (as presented here) may be used to evaluate behavior of speci ed mechanisms in the presence of network failures, but is not a general protocol veri cation tool.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a new method for automating the robustness testing of multicast routing protocols, in the presence of network failures.
We do not claim nor attempt to provide mathematical proof of protocol correctness or veri cation. Rather, we have targeted protocol robustness and endeavored to systematize its testing and analysis for a particular domain; multicast routing.
Drawing from chip testing and FSM techniques, our method synthesizes the protocol tests automatically. These tests consist of the topology, event sequences and network faults. The following techniques were used to automate each of the test dimensions:
Topology synthesis: using the state transition table, our method synthesizes N ? router LAN topologies necessary to generate protocol messages or states, in terms of a global system state. Fault investigation: from the global state, forward implication is used to test the behavior of the system in the presence of faults.
Sequence of events: if an error is found, backward implication constructs a sequence of events leading to the erroneous state, which is used to analyze the protocol behavior.
Timing problems: we have presented an example of transforming a timing problem into a sequencing problem to analyze acknowledged messages.
We have conducted a case study for PIM-DM, and found several scenarios in which the protocol behaved erroneously.
Our method may also be applicable to other protocols that can be represented by the global FSM model given in this paper.
We are in the process of conducting a quantitative analysis and evaluation of our method in terms of complexity and completeness; i.e. the number of topologies synthesized, state transitions traversed and faults covered. We are also investigating complexity reduction techniques by introducing equivalence classes of states and topologies, using counting equivalence and repetition constructors 11].
Future directions of this research include applying the FOTG method to other multicast protocols, including end-to-end performance analysis, extending the method to apply to topologies containing multiple LANs, and to include other network failures.
